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THE UNIFIED BAR: WILL
A CLOSED SHOP SERVE THE
LAWYER AND THE PUBLIC T
HAROLD BROWN
Now pending before the Supreme Judicial Court is a petition by the
Massachusetts Bar Association for adoption by Rule of Court of
the so-called "unified bar,"' simply defined as a rule which would pro-
hibit the practice of law by an attorney who fails to join and maintain his
membership in good standing in the newly-to-be formed Bar of Massa-
chusetts (Petition of M.B.A., S.J.C. Eq. 69780). In its earlier form as
the "integrated" bar, substantially the same proposal was rejected by the
S.J.C. almost a generation ago. (in re Integrated Bar, 321 Mass. 747, 74
N.E. 2d 140 (1947)). The question is whether the establishment of a
unified bar would now be "in the interest of the public and the adminis-
tration of justice."
The petition must be considered in the light of the pending petition
of the Boston Bar Association for adoption of the A.B.A. Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility (Petition of B.B.A., S.J.C. Eq. No. 69760).2 It
may be noted that with certain proposed amendments, both the M.B.A.
and B.B.A. are in substantial agreement in their support for the adoption
of a Code of Professional Responsibility. But while the M.B.A. is a
t This article is reprinted from the February 1971 issue of the Boston Bar
Journal.
1 Of the 31 states which have adopted an integrated or unified bar, the most recent
are Wis. (1956), Ga. (1964), S.C. (1967), and N.H. (1968), the remainder
having generally acted from the late 1920's through W.W. II. Since a new effort
is apparently being made to bring the remainder of the states into the fold, perhaps
half of the attorneys in the country are now obligated to examine their response
to such a drive, lest it turn into a stampede. For that reason, the Massachusetts
controversy may be regarded as generic.
2 According to the latest figures, the A.B.A. Code has been adopted in more than
half of the states as well as in some special cases such as in the U.S. Patent Office.
strong advocate of the unified bar, a poll of
the membership of the B.B.A. showed two
to one in opposition and its Council voted
unanimously against adoption. As may be
inferred, this writer is strongly in opposition
to both petitions.
It is unfortunate that the pressures for
earning a living, keeping up with the deluge
of legal literature, or simple apathy, have
blocked the examination of these vital and
detailed proposals by more than a handful
of attorneys, though it must be conceded
that, in the words of Professor Andrew L.
Kaufman of Harvard Law School, the
proposed Canons of Ethics, Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, Ethical Consider-
ations, and footnotes present a serious
challenge to anyone who would attempt
merely to read them once from beginning to
end (22 Harvard L.S. Bulletin, October,
1970, at p. 19). The "unified" bar proposal
was set forth in a recent issue of the Boston
Bar Journal, the entire content of which was
devoted to a discussion of the pro's and
con's (B.B.J., May, 1970). While the uni-
fied bar petition is far more brief than the
proposed Code of Professional Ethics, since
it consists primarily of a set of proposed by-
laws, only a few of the basic problems can
be discerned from a reading of the proposal.
Even the Boston Bar Journal discussion of
the issues raised by the unified bar pro-
posal, fails to disclose the fundamental ob-
jections, principally because the B.B.A. has
vigorously supported the closely related
proposal for adoption of the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility.
In this setting, it is evident that both
petitions are now reaching a crucial stage,
possibly with inadequate time for discus-
sion and to stir those who may wish to per-
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form an active role in the deliberations
which would give both proposals the statu-
tory effect owed to Rules of Court. As with
other pervasive legislation, it may be found
that lethargy will evoke disaster and that
woeful cries may follow the event.
The proposed by-laws would grant total
authority to the Bar of Massachusetts to
regulate the practice of law within the Com-
monwealth, the constituency of its govern-
ing board to be allotted on a theoretically
proportional representation among the sev-
eral counties, with a slight weighting against
Suffolk County, since full respect for the
one man-one vote rule would have given
Boston a majority in the Council. Such
avoidance of purely democratic principles
undoubtedly reflects the historical resent-
ments engendered by the strength of the
Boston Bar Association, not only as a mat-
ter of membership and financial income,
but also its resultant vitality in such matters
as a permanent physical plant, a full-time
paid staff, and vigorous administrative and
committee activity. Of the seventy or more
city, county, and special bar associations
within the Commonwealth, it must be con-
ceded that few have such advantages and
several are little more than social clubs with
emphasis on local prestige rather than a
record of performance. So viewed, the peti-
tion for a unified bar may appear to be a
struggle for power between the two domi-
nant bar associations, with little hope for
resolution of their conflicting interests, ul-
timate authority in a statewide association
necessarily being consigned to the new Bar
of Massachusetts, with the B.B.A. aspiring,
at best, to a role of veto power. As for
other county or city bar associations, while
their independence would be sublimated,
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such diminution of their power might not
seem as crucial. As will be seen, however,
such a simplified version of the purpose
behind the unified bar and the organiza-
tional struggle it has created, 3 completely
misses the true import of the proposal.
The proponents of the unified bar lay
emphasis on the need for universal support
of bar association activities, not merely for
the financial power emanating from the
enforced membership dues of all lawyers
practicing in the state, but even more so for
the programs which such funding would
support, as well as the presumed power
which such a monolithic force could exer-
cise in such matters as legislation, enforce-
ment of minimum fee schedules, sponsoring
the so-called Clients Security Fund, and
other matters of general interest such as
the appointment of judges, the restructur-
ing of the judicial branch, and serving the
public through the proper administration of
justice.
It must be conceded that the closed union
visualized in the unified bar would, indeed,
acquire all such attributes of power and ef-
ficiency. But quoting Knickerbocker Holi-
day, "while democracy is far less efficient
than dictatorship, that very inefficiency
makes life tolerable." The attributes of a
police-state hardly need to be explained to
attorneys. The inherent objections to com-
3 The M.B.A. and B.B.A. recently consolidated
their programs for continuing legal education,
but anomalies still exist. Given the vigorous
handling of grievance matters by the B.B.A. and
the historic weakness of many local groups, it
would seem that the principal problem is outside
of the urban area. (See LaBelle, "New Disci-
plinary Rules for Michigan Attorneys," 54 Ju-
dicature 154 (Nov., 1970)).
pulsion are not idly to be overlooked. Nor
is there any social or economic need of a
"closed-shop" for attorneys, there being no
employer whose bargaining power needs to
be counter-balanced by collective activity.
To the contrary, there are many basic issues
in which the public interest may be in direct
conflict with the so-called "guild" interest
of lawyers. The power of a unified bar
would undoubtedly jeopardize such interests
and effectively diminish the power of dis-
senters. For if the republican form of gov-
ernment is nourished by the existence of
two vigorous political parties, certainly the
monopoly power of a unified bar cannot be
justified. The very efficiency and power
claimed by proponents of the unified bar,
would effectively smother all opposition,
regardless of the public will or interest.
Just recently, it was demonstrated that
the public demanded "no fault" insurance
as an answer to soaring insurance costs,
interminable delays in court determinations,
and the conviction that attorneys were un-
necessary obstacles to a solution.4 Although
such a noble experiment may ultimately
prove illusory, it can hardly be assumed
that the monolithic opposition of the or-
ganized bar would have been beneficial to
the public interest. Perhaps the concept will
fail, if it at least does not obtain the support
of the bar in perfecting its operation. Yet
there is much substance to the argument
that the opposition of the bar may have had
a strong flavor of self-preference rather than
noble motivation.
With regard to the maintenance of mini-
mum fee schedules, offered by the M.B.A.
4 Ch. 670 of Mass. Acts of 1970.
as one of the principal arguments for the
unified bar, there seems not to be the
slightest predilection for the public interest
even though that paramount concern has
been codified in the very heart of the Anti-
trust Laws by their prohibition of any
combination to fix prices, including both
minimum and maximum rates (15 U.S.C.
§ 1; U.S. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29
(1960); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S.
145 (1968)). Even the A.B.A. has given
its support to such minimum fee schedules
by its latest ruling that consistent violation
may be "evidence of unethical conduct."
(A.B.A. Formal Opinion 323). Completely
unimpressed by any guild-type protective
justification, the Government has instituted
four suits against real estate associations
and their members, the first of which has
just culminated in a final consent decree
barring the board from fixing commission
rates, publishing commission fee schedules,
recommending that its members adhere to
any suggested fee schedule, or taking any
punitive action against a member who re-
fuses to adhere to any such recommenda-
tion concerning fees. (U.S. v. Prince
George's County Board of Realtors, Inc.
(D.C. Md. 1971) 70 T.C. 73,393). Clearly
there is a paramount public interest in ob-
taining services at the market price, without
interference by any combination of persons.
Yet though this charge was raised over a
year ago (B.B.J. Nov. , 1969) and has
been vigorously urged upon the S.J.C. in
the pending petition for adoption of the
A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility,
not a single bar association has even
deigned to take notice of the problem.
While the proposed Canons would proscribe
even the "appearance of unprofessional
conduct" (Canon 9), the M.B.A. urges the
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maintenance of such minimum fee sched-
ules as a prime reason for adoption of the
unified bar.
Another major argument has been the
need for support of the so-called "Clients'
Security Fund" designed to provide restitu-
tion to any client who has been defrauded
by any practicing attorney. It is suggested
that all attorneys should be required to sup-
port such a necessary project, such an argu-
ment having been the probable instigator
for the rebirth of the unified bar concept.
Again, the premise may be unsound in view
of the prevalent opinion that such a solu-
tion for fraud on clients is wholly ineffective
for lack of sufficient publicity to the general
public, the deficiencies resulting from ad-
ministration of the program by those who
have to pay the bill, and the gross inade-
quacy of the fund to cover actual losses.
For example, as against the $10,000. an-
nually contributed by the M.B.A., it is
estimated that full coverage would require
an annual contribution of close to $200. by
every practicing attorney. Certainly the
public needs protection, but the solution
offered by the Clients' Security Fund is
apparently quite inferior to other methods
(See Brown, "Some Observations on Legal
Fees," 24 Southwestern L.J. 565 (1970)).
In other professions, such as that of the real
estate broker, a surety bond must be ob-
tained as a condition of each license re-
newal.
Perhaps the greatest need of the public
is to open the avenues of judicial relief to
the tens of millions in the middle income
brackets, potential clients who may never
see an attorney in their lifetime. Aside from
several proposals for overcoming the fee
obstacle through insurance or extended pay-
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ment plans, perhaps the most fruitful may
lie in so-called "group legal services." (See
B.F. Christensen, "Lawyers for People
of Moderate Means" (1970 Amer. Bar
Found.) including a full discussion of the
series of recent U.S. Supreme Court rulings
giving constitutional sanction to such pro-
grams). In spite of the unanimous opinion
of the A.B.A. Special Committee on Avail-
ability of Legal Services, its proposal was
summarily discussed by the A.B.A. with the
comment "that the lawyers of America are
not now prepared to have group legal serv-
ices extended" (See Nahstoll, 48 Tex. L.R.
348, n. 35). Based on that public-be-
damned attitude, there was instead adopted
a restriction that would prohibit such group
legal services "unless constitutionally re-
quired at the time of the rendition of the
services" (A.B.A. Code of Prof. Resp.
DR2-103 (D)), characterized by Professor
Nahstoll as "unrealistic, inadequate, irre-
sponsible, and unprofessional. It disserves
both the public and the bar." (Id., at p.
350). That very provision is now contained
in the Code offered in the pending B.B.A.
petition, to which not one word of dissent
has been offered by the M.B.A. It may well
be asked whether the concentrated legisla-
tive power sought through the unified bar
would constitute an effort to emulate the
well-financed ten year campaign by the
A.M.A. to resist all efforts designed to
make medical services more readily avail-
able to the entire population. Although
beneficent paternalism may accomplish re-
sults, perhaps it were better to heed the
words of John Adams, "Power always
thinks it has a great soul and vast views be-
yond the comprehension of the weak."
It is not here in issue whether any partic-
ular version of these programs will prevail.
The significant matter is the gross error in
the assumption that the monolithic power
of the unified bar will serve the public in-
terest rather than its own. To the contrary,
the reports from unified bar jurisdictions
extolling the results of such a statutory rule
of court,5 may merely signify that self-
preference now has no countervailing force
sufficient to sustain the hopeless task of ef-
fective opposition.
Even more basic is the question of the
means through which such power would be
obtained and the standards which govern its
exercise. For while there is hardly anyone
who would object to the need for encourag-
ing all attorneys to join and participate
actively in bar association programs, it is
undemocratic to prescribe that such mem-
bership in non-governmental associations be
enforced by Rule of Court with statutory
effect. Even more fundamental is the objec-
tion to making the continued exercise of the
privilege of practicing law subject to the
control of a private organization.
Aside from such social injustice, it is
pertinent to examine the rules by which all
attorneys would be governed in the exercise
of that privilege. For it is gross error to as-
sume that all one need do is present his cer-
tificate of admission to the bar and pay his
annual dues in order to maintain his mem-
bership in the bar association. To the con-
trary, the by-laws submitted for adoption
through Court Rule, would expressly incor-
porate by reference the newly proposed
5 See In re Integration of the Bar, 5 Wis. 2d 618,
621, 93 N.W. 2d 601, 602; see similar comment
on the integrated bar of California in Petition of
Florida State Bar Assn., 40 So. 2d 902, 905.
A.B.A. Canons of Ethics as implemented
by the Code of Professional Responsibility
and the general sense of approval proposed
for the Ethical Considerations (Article 18),
all of which are now before the Supreme
Judicial Court for enactment. Although this
writer has strenuously opposed the approval
of that Code, perhaps even worse would be
the adoption of the unified bar without
specific rules, thus granting to the bar as-
sociation a blank check for the standards of
its governing the profession. Such pervasive
power would not only be abhorrent to the
constitutional objections to the delegation
of authority without adequate standards
(A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S.,
295 U.S. 495 (1935)), but would also
consign the legal profession to the status of
a veritable police state. If it be suggested
that the silence of the proposed by-laws
means that no attorney may be expelled
from the Bar of Massachusetts except
through disbarment or censure by the court,
then at the very least, the by-laws should so
state. But even then, the B.B.A. and M.B.A.
are chargeable with circuity since the seri-
ous objections to the Code of Professional
Responsibility have been met with their ex-
press statement that the bar association can
be expected to use discretion in the enforce-
ment of standards which are too harsh or
too vague.
It is thus necessary to examine the pro-
posed A.B.A. Code in order to see what the
unified bar really offers as the rules under
which all practicing attorneys must live.
Aside from the serious ethical and legal ob-
jections to the proposed Code, it may also
be noted that no less than eight of its provi-
sions have been challenged under the Dec-
laration of Rights of the Massachusetts
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Constitution and under the due process,
equal protection, and free speech clauses of
the United States Constitution. General
literature has been critical of the Code (See
"American Bar Association Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility: A Symposium" 48
Texas L.R. 255 (1970) and particularly P.
Shuchman, "Ethics and Legal Ethics: The
Propriety of the Canons as a Group Moral
Code," 37 Geo. Wash. L.R. 244 (1968))
cogently demonstrating that the canons are
primarily directed at "the solo practitioner
and the small firms, to those called the little
lawyers" (at p. 245)), and this writer has
strenuously opposed its adoption. (See
Brown "A.B.A. Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility: In Defense of Mediocrity" 7
Trial 29 (Aug.-Sept., 1970), republished
in revised form in 5 Valp. L.R. 95 (1970)
and being republished in The Catholic Law-
yer and Boston College Law School Annual
Survey of Massachusetts Law (1971 edi-
tion) ).
While extensive exposition is not here
feasible, consider the following highlights of
what the Code would make unethical:
1. The negligent handling of any legal
matter (not persistent or gross negli-
gence) (DR6-101(A)(1));
2. The handling of any matter which the
lawyer knows or should know he is
not competent to handle, unless he as-
sociates himself with one who is
competent (competence being used in
the sense of specialization and assur-
ing the dominance of major law
firms) (DR6-101(A)(3));
3. Ilegal conduct involving moral tur-
pitude; any dishonesty, deceit or mis-
representation; prejudicial conduct; or
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any conduct that adversely reflects on
an attorney's fitness to practice law
(none of which standards are amen-
able to definition) (DRI-102(A)
(1)-(6) );
4. Failure to report any Code violation
by another attorney (the infamous
"guilt by association" now to be su-
perseded by "guilt by accidental ob-
servation and failure to report" (DRI-
103(A));
5. Any referral fees, except that partners
and associates would be excepted
(designed to discriminate against the
single practitioner and small law
firm) (DR2-107(A)(2)); and
6. Failure to report a client's fraud to
the offended person, if the client re-
fuses or fails to make restitution
(the client-attorney privilege being
amended to require such disclosure)
(DR7-102(B) (1) and (2) and DR4-
(C) (2)).
As previously stated, adoption of the
unified bar without a Code would appear
to be an unconstitutional delegation of
authority. But to adopt the Code and dele-
gate its implementation to a private group,
would be even worse, the prescribed stan-
dards of conduct being contrary both to
ethical and legal principles.
When the proponents of the unified bar
rely on its adoption by 31 states and the
fact that once adopted, there has never
been a repeal, they have really said very
little. Almost without exception, such states
do not include the states with strong com-
mercial and industrial economies, princi-
pally in the northeast quadrant of the
Nation" (Me., Mass., R.I., Conn., N.Y.,
N.J., Pa., Del., Md., Ohio, Ind., Ill., Ia.,
Minn., Mont., Col., Kan., Tenn.) and
Hawaii. The absence of repeal is con-
sonant with the power of dictatorial control
to demoralize dissent.
Proponents of the unified bar make only
passing reference to the supposed sustain-
ing of its constitutionality in Lathrop v.
Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961), although
the numerous opinions in that 65 page re-
port disclose sharply divided views as well
as veritable indecision in the opinion of the
plurality (Id., at 865). In order to com-
prehend whatever that case may have held,
it is necessary to note that after twice reject-
ing the integrated bar (244 Wis. 8, 11
N.W. 2d 604, 249 Wis. 523, 25 N.W. 2d
500) in spite of its direct authorization by
statute (Wis. Rev. Stat. sec. 256.31), the
Wisconsin Supreme Court first approved it
on two year probation (273 Wis. 281, 77
N.W. 2d 602) and then indefinitely (5
Wis. 2d 618, 93 N.W. 2d 601). With such
birth pains, it is not surprising that the ap-
proved plan contained severe limitations
6 In many states which have adopted the inte-
grated or unified bar, sparse population or great
distances may well have contributed to the lack
of cohesion and support for voluntary associa-
tions. For example, the $50.00 maximum dues
prescribed by the New Hampshire Supreme Court
for the state's 750 attorneys, would produce a
paltry annual budget of $35,000, perhaps indicat-
ing the need for governmental assistance for
effective programs, including grievance proce-
dures. By contrast, Manhattan alone has three
very strong bar associations and in Massachusetts,
both the M.B.A. ($35. annual dues) and the
B.B.A. ($65. annual dues) have approximately
4,000 members on whom each may rely, with
over two-thirds of the state's 13,000 lawyers be-
longing to one or more associations.
such as the sole requirement of membership
being the payment of annual dues not to
exceed $20., representation on a strict "one
man-one vote" basis whereby the City of
Milwaukee retained its majority voice, the
retention by the Supreme Court of "all of
the traditional powers of a court to super-
vise the activities of practicing lawyers...
none of (which were) delegated to the In-
tegrated Bar" (367 U.S. 820, 854, em-
phasis the Court's), and the strict limitation
of its legislative activity to matters involving
the "administration of justice, court reform,
and legal practice," the Wisconsin Supreme
Court having specifically held, "If the law-
yers of this state wish by group action to
engage in legislative activities not so au-
thorized, they will have to do so within the
framework of some voluntary association,
and not the State Bar." (10 Wis. 2d 230,
239-240, 102 N.W. 2d 404; 409-410).
With such severe limitations, the Supreme
Court was constrained to comment (at p.
828), "We are, therefore, confronted . . .
only with a question of compelled financial
support of group activities, not with in-
voluntary membership in any other aspect."
As pointed out by three of the Justices
(Harlan, Frankfurter, and Black), the par-
ticular version involved no self-policing
through delegated authority which would
have been violative of Schechter (supra)
(Id., at pp. 854 and 878).
The only federal constitutional attack
thus available to the individual objector was
based on alleged intrusion of his freedom
of association and freedom of speech, based
on the compulsory financial contribution to
an association which could use the funds to
sponsor legislation offensive to the objec-
tor. The plurality opinion of Justice Harlan
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(joined by Warren, Clark, and Stewart)
held the record insufficient to lay the basis
for a ruling on the free speech issue, with-
out returning the case for further proceed-
ings; Justice Harlan (with Frankfurter)
felt that the severe limitations on possible
legislative activity were sufficient to pre-
clude such constitutional objection; and
Justice Whittaker separately assented, thus
supposedly constituting a seven-man deci-
sion. Lengthy dissents by Justices Black
and Douglas leave much doubt as to
whether the case decided anything, Black
expressly stating that no one knew what
had been decided, especially himself (Id.,
at 865), since two Justices had voted to
strike on the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments and four Justices had affirmed solely
because the constitutional issue was not be-
fore the Court on a sufficient record (Id.,
pp. 848 and 866).
Since the Supreme Judicial Court has yet
to approve any form of the unified bar, ob-
jectors are not limited to the possible con-
stitutional objections which its "legislative"
action might raise (Lathrop, supra, at
826). It may thus accord close attention to
"legislative" arguments against the unified
bar contained in the bitter dissents of both
Justices Black and Douglas. For example,
it may note the comments that "A medical
association that fights socialized medicine
protects the fees of that association" (Id.,
at p. 879) and ". . . the (Bar) association
has been active in exploiting the monopoly
position given by the licensed character of
the profession. Thus, the Bar has compiled
and published a schedule of recommended
minimum fees." (Id., at 880), respectively
pertinent to the previously discussed issues
of group legal services and anti-trust vio-
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lations. Even more cogent, however, was
the Douglas conclusion that approval of
such legislative power would constitute
"carte blanche to put professional people
into goose-stepping brigades" (Lathrop,
supra, at 884) and that "the First Amend-
ment applies strictures designed to keep
our society becoming moulded into pat-
terns of conformity which satisfy the ma-
jority" (Id., at 885).
Although it might be constitutional and
even ethically compatible to require a rea-
sonable annual license fee either specifi-
cally directed toward the funding of a
Clients Security Fund (in re Matter of a
Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court
of Delaware, 257 A.2d 384 (1969)) or as
a general contribution to the sustenance of
numerous bar association activities, partic-
ularly including post-graduate educational
programs, the unwillingness of the propo-
nents to accept such a tax arrangement
would appear to offer proof that much
more is intended. That proposition was
part of the underlying basis for the strong
and rational dissent of Justices Duncan and
Grimes to the 1968 adoption of the unified
bar by New Hampshire on a three-year
probationary basis (In re Unification of the
N.H. Bar, 109 N.H. 262, 248 A.2d 711
(1968)). At least the majority avoided
equivocation in its unfounded conclusion
that "under the voluntary association, dis-
cipline and requiring observance of ethical
standards is ineffective" and its pure spec-
ulation that "imposition of ethical stan-
dards . . . and an effective means of
enforcing their observance" would facilitate
the court's task to protect the public against
unethical activities (Id., at 713). In fact,
with its finding that 706 out of the 750 at-
torneys in the state already belonged to the
voluntary association, there may be reason
to doubt its emphasis on the need for ad-
ditional funds to support bar programs.
Aside from the grave constitutional
question in such delegated disciplinary pow-
ers, it is perfectly clear that regimentation
lies at the root of the unified bar proposal.
For example, given the financial as well as
highly emotional bias of many attorneys to
such a program as "no fault" auto insur-
ance, is there any doubt that an aroused
bar would have little difficulty in accusing
a champion of that program, of "prejudi-
cial conduct" or "any conduct that ad-
versely reflects on an attorney's fitness to
practice law"? (See DR 1-102(A)(1)-
(6)). The mere threat of such a charge,
would effectively smother the action of any
individual attorney who would question the
views of the Establishment. With Lincoln-
ian clarity, Justice Grimes was thus im-
pelled to dissent in the New Hampshire
proceedings (supra, at p. 715):
"By decreeing unification for three years,
presumably the court intends to take an-
other look at the problem in 1972; but
what can be seen then? If there has been
improvement, this will not prove that satis-
factory gains could not have been made by
means less injurious to personal liberty
because such means will not have been
tried. Against what then will we measure
the loss in personal freedom to determine
if it has been worth the price. We have the
obligation I think to try the less onerous
means first before embarking upon this
plan" (Underscoring supplied).
If "discipline and requiring observance
of ethical standards" be the heart of the
problem,7 perhaps the courts have over-
looked their responsibilities in the assump-
tion that grievance committees of bar
associations are the effective means of in-
vestigation and enforcement. None could
quarrel with the court's establishment of a
grievance board, with members (not nec-
essarily all lawyers) appointed by and
serving at the pleasure of the court, with
full power to conduct hearings, subpoena
powers, and an adequate staff, all to be
funded as part of the judicial budget.8 In
spite of Michigan's adoption of the inte-
grated bar and a strict code of ethics, the
recent scandal in that state disclosed the
gross inadequacy of existing procedures for
the handling of legitimate complaints, par-
ticularly in the non-urban areas where
friendship and other ties made a mockery
of enforcement.9 Confronted with that re-
alization, the Michigan Supreme Court did
establish effective procedures with remark-
able results, not the least of which was the
discipline of seven attorneys in the partic-
ular locality where public outrage had
reached extreme limits. To forestall such a
crisis and to provide a genuine foundation
for public confidence, this writer has re-
quested the S.J.C. to establish such pro-
cedures in Massachusetts as an alternative
to the adoption of the A.B.A. Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility. Lest it be thought
that the unified bar would accomplish that
7 See A.B.A. report of retired Supreme Court Jus-
tice Tom Clark, including charges of laxity, lack
of cooperation, and ineffective procedures to
process legitimate complaints.
8 See Editorial, "Fiscal Independence of the Ju-
diciary," 54 Judicature 138 (Nov., 1970).
9 See LaBelle, supra, n.3, at p. 154.
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purpose, it should be stressed that the pro-
posal involves the creation of a quasi-ju-
dicial body with power comparable to that
of a master in equity, which should be
wholly independent of an organization
whose individual members might be party
to proceedings before it.
It is questionable whether the propo-
nents of the unified bar would be satisfied
with the severe limitations imposed by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, without which
the plan would clearly face grave constitu-
tional challenges. There are two ready al-
ternatives to the unified bar, namely, the
annual assessment of a reasonable fee for
the license to practice, the proceeds of
which would be allocated by court order,
and the establishment of an independent,
quasi-judicial body to investigate and pro-
cess grievance complaints, funded in part
from such assessments or through the ju-
dicial budget. As indicated by both of the
dissenting justices in the New Hampshire
proceedings, such alternatives should be
exhausted before extreme measures be ap-
proved, particularly when there is substan-
tial doubt that such measures will provide
a workable remedy for the most serious
problem. Not only is it impossible for the
proponents to show that such alternatives
would not suffice, but it is even more
doubtful that they can satisfy the burden of
proving that the requested dictatorial con-
trol is in the public interest or conducive to
the administration of justice. Ultimately, it
is for the Supreme Judicial Court to decide
whether it will permit a popularity contest
to supplant its historical reliance on princi-
ple and the protection of the cherished
rights of the individual, be he a single at-
torney or just an ordinary man.
